Introduction
This is the third part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) seen as an extended model of corporate governance and the corresponding firm's objective function 1 . In the first part of this essay (Sacconi, 2010a) , I
provided the following definition of CSR as a multi-stakeholder governance model (Sacconi 2004 (Sacconi , 2006b (Sacconi , 2007a (Sacconi , 2009 :
CSR is a model of extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors, managers) have responsibilities that range from fulfillment of fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfillment of analogous -even if not identicalfiduciary duties towards all the firm's stakeholders.
This definition has been articulated and defended as an institutional model of corporate governance implementable through explicitly expressed norms of self-regulation based on company/stakeholders social dialog -which means that CSR is neither a matter of managerial discretion nor one of external regulation enforced though statutory laws. The basic idea is that such a model of self-regulation, provided it is not obstructed by statutory company law which imposes a single-stakeholder fiduciary model and objective function on companies, is self sustaining. Hence the relevant perspective from which to understand the normative nature of CSR is that of an institution in Aoki's sense (see Aoki 2002, and Sacconi 2010a) . Let us summarize Aoki's definition:
An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about a salient way in which a game is repeatedly played; it is based on a summary representation of compressed information about the equilibrium strategy combination which is currently being played in the repeated game characteristic of a given social domain (cfr. Aoki 2001).

  
However, the addition of a social contract perspective essentially completes the definition of 'institution' (Sacconi 2010a) . The aim of this addition is to account for the crucial role that not just regularities of behavior and descriptive beliefs but also of norms and normative beliefs play as inherent parts of the beliefs system characterizing an institution as an equilibrium supported by a consistent system of expectations. To explain the role of the social contract on explicitly expressed self-regulatory norms of corporate governance, I take the game theoretic perspective of a repeated game between the firm -or those who occupy positions of authority within the hierarchical control structure of the firm -and the series of its stakeholders as the typical game in the 'corporate governance domain' (Aoki 2001) .
Within this context, four roles played by a Rawlsian social contract have been identified in the first part of this essay in determining the equilibrium institution that satisfies the normative requirement of CSR. They are at the same time able to meet the main game theoretical challenges for the emergence of such an institution.
• The cognitive-constructive role, which answers the question on how the firm works out the set of commitments that it can undertake with respect to generic states of the world it is aware of not being able to predict in any detail, and therefore what types of possible equilibrium behavior the firm can work out so that stakeholders may entertain expectations about them;
• The normative role, which answers the question on what (if any) pattern of interaction the firm and its stakeholders must a priori select from the set of possible equilibria to be carried out ex post (according to the answer given to the first question), if they adopt an ex ante standpoint enabling an agreement to be reached impartially;
• The motivational role, which answers the question on what and how many equilibrium patterns of behavior, amongst those that may emerge ex post from the interaction between firm and stakeholder, would retain their motivational force if firm and stakeholder were able to agree in an ex ante perspective on a CSR norm along the lines of the second question;
• The cognitive-predictive role concerning how the ex ante agreement on a CSR norm affects the beliefs formation process whereby a firm and its stakeholders cognitively converge on a system of mutually consistent expectations such that they reciprocally predict from each another the execution of a given equilibrium in their ex post interaction (given that more than one equilibrium point still retains motivational force according to the answer to the third question). The question to be answered by this function is thus 'does the norm shape the expectation formation process so that in the end it will coincide with what the ex ante agreed principle would require of firm and stakeholders?'
The first two roles have been examined at length in part I and II respectively. In particular, it was seen in part II (see Sacconi 2010b) that, from the ex ante perspective, a Rawlsian social contract is able to solve the normative equilibrium selection problem, i.e. to choose a governance structure through a decision procedure that satisfies elementary conditions of impersonality, impartiality, and empathy. At the same time, it resulted in the egalitarian solution, consistent with the Rawlsian maximin principle, not just because of those ethical assumptions, but precisely because it internalizes the requirement of self-sustainability and implementation in equilibrium. This takes us to the typical Rawlsian maximization of the worst-off participant seen as a criterion for the constitutional choice of the firm's governance structure basically consistent with both justification and realistic implementation.
Nevertheless, roles three and four still need to be explained. In fact, although the social contract is able to select ex ante a reasonable equilibrium, ex post we are again faced with the problem of the incentives to which players will respond when they exit from the originalposition-and-veil-of-ignorance thought experiment and return to 'the game of life' (Binmore 2005) where they play according to the entire set of their preferences and motivations to act.
This requires discussion of the equilibrium selection problem from the ex post perspective.
To gain better understanding of where we stand, consider that the appropriate game representation of the firm/stakeholders interaction is the iterated Trust Game, with the following stage game: Within this payoff space, every point above the dotted line corresponds to an equilibrium strategy profile such that player A 'enters' with a given frequency and player B abuses or not with the appropriate probability mixture (Fudenberg and Levine 1989, Fudenberg 1991) . Of course, the most relevant equilibria are those where player A never enters because player B will always abuse, with average discounted payoffs (1,1), and the equilibrium with average discounted payoffs (4,4) where player 2 never abuses and hence player 1 enters each time. But also remarkable is the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the firm B is believed to make a commitment on the mixed strategy (0.75a, 0.25 ¬a) . In fact, B may develop a reputation for being this type by playing the two pure strategies with the attached probability throughout all the repetitions of the game. Thus each stakeholder in the role of player A necessarily enters, since his/her payoff is the same as staying out (namely 1) -i.e. s/he is indifferent between entering and staying out (if player B were to give him/her an infinitesimal additional positive utility ε by reducing his/her abuse probability correspondingly, 'entrance' would be certain).
This gives B an average expected payoff of 4.75, which is the best payoff that player B can obtain in equilibrium. Then player B's best response is to stick to this type/commitment These companies -evidently responsible for intentional breaches of their ethical commitments -are doomed by their shareholders to collapse more dramatically than would be 'rational' according to those shareholders' self-interest (i.e. their share-value-maximization). All these examples illustrate behaviors by active stakeholders that cannot be captured in terms of their mere self-interest and cannot be understood as mere defense of their own material interest.
Admittedly some of these behaviors can be understood as reflecting a concern for other stakeholders' well-being, rather than the well-being of the active stakeholders themselves.
More exactly, however, they express the stakeholders' attachment to impersonal principles of justice, i.e. a desire to conform with socially accepted norms of fair treatment -even when such conformity concerns not so much the active stakeholder itself but mostly the well-being of third parties. Hence only disinterested (from the egoistic point of view) motivations may be of relevance in explaining such action. A proper understanding of these third-partiesconcerned non-egoistic behaviors in terms of norm compliance based on conformist preferences has been the focus of previous works on this topic (see Grimalda and Sacconi 2005; Sacconi and Grimalda 2007) . Here I shall try to make sense of the evidence by focusing on the basic firm/stakeholders bilateral strategic relationships. This perspective is also a basis for extending the explanation to larger firms/stakeholders networks, where the creation of social capital and support for non-egoistically profitable trust relationships is at stake (see Degli Antoni 2009, Degli Antoni and .
How does the social contract approach account for these apparently 'irrational' but unselfish actions, given that acquiescence would be the stakeholder's best response? In part II (Sacconi 2010b ) the focus was on the ex ante agreement on CSR norms and standards of behaviour as a useful collective decision device for the unique selection of an equilibrium point. The concern now is with how stakeholders react to the discovery that in the game of life the firm has strong incentives to behave in a way quite different from strict compliance with the ex ante agreed equilibrium, and de facto it prefers to deviate from it. As a consequence it seeks to develop a reputation of being a type of player who systematically adopts a sophisticated abuse behaviour that, if it was taken for granted, would induce stakeholders to abandon the ex ante agreed equilibrium point and adapt to the less than fully compliant equilibrium profile.
This can be understood as a struggle for the ex post equilibrium selection amongst the many still possible. What we are in fact facing are two tightly connected but nevertheless distinct game theoretical problems. Firstly, ex ante equilibrium selection by agreement does not necessarily work well as an ex post equilibrium selection mechanism. Even though it ensures that the decision taken 'behind the veil of ignorance' could be self-enforceable if there were a system of expectations that predicted that decision as the effective ex post behavior of the parties, it does not ensure that these expectations will de facto emerge, and therefore that selection will be ex post effective. There is no logical necessity linking ex ante equilibrium selection to the emergence of the shared knowledge condition required for the unicity of the solution in the ex post perspective. But, secondly, this also raises the compliance problem again. Given multiple ex post equilibria, why should the player comply with the agreement by carrying out exactly the equilibrium chosen under the veil of ignorance? The problem is that, in the presence of multiple equilibria, each with some motivating force conditional on existence of a system of expectations consistent with it, no particular equilibria has any reason to be carried out, and thus the one corresponding to the ex ante agreement need not have any incentive effect on compliance.
  
A different answer could be given if the ex ante selective function of an impartial agreement by itself performed a causal role in changing incentives and beliefs on the set of admissible equilibria of the game of life relevant in the ex post perspective. This can happen along two routes. The first is a behavioral mechanism according to which the agreed equilibrium carries additional motivational (i.e. preferential) force precisely because it has been selected 'behind the veil of ignorance'. The second is (again) a psychological mechanism according to which agreeing 'behind the veil' (as a matter of fact about reasoning, but without logical necessity) also influences beliefs about other parties' behavior ex post: that is, it induces a state of shared beliefs whereby what was chosen behind the veil will be also implemented ex post. These two behavioral hypotheses are interlocked (i.e.
beliefs formation must be granted in order to introduce the psychological preferences). Some empirical evidence for them can be found in related experimental works Faillo 2010, Faillo, Ottone, Sacconi 2008) . We discuss the first hypothesis in the next few sections by introducing a Rawlsian idea of the sense of justice and the corresponding model of conformist preferences. The latter hypothesis will be shortly addressed in section 5.

The true Rawlsian theory of norm compliance
An original approach to the institutional compliance problem was suggested by John Rawls in the Theory of Justice (1971) , where he proposed the 'sense of justice' as a solution for the stability problem of a well-ordered society -i.e. a society whose institutions are arranged according to the principles of justice (norms in our sense) chosen under a 'veil of ignorance'.
This solution, however, was for long overlooked by economists and game theorists because it was at odds with the methodology of rational choice in that it resorted to socio-psychological assumptions common in theories on moral learning.
However, given the behaviorist turn in microeconomics, it is time to reconsider this neglected solution and to acknowledge that it may suggest an illuminating explanation of why person. On the contrary, it is the system of principles of justice in itself that constitutes the object of the sense of justice.
The question to be answered thus becomes how it is possible that principles themselves are capable of influencing our affections -that is, of generating the sense of justice as a relatively self-contained 'desire to conform with the principles'. The answer is twofold.
First, the sense of justice is not independent of the content of principles. These are principles that we could have decided to agree upon under a veil of ignorance as expressions of our rationality as free and equal moral persons. These principles are mutually advantageous and hence impartially acceptable by a rational choice, even if it is made from an impartial perspective, for they promote our interests and hence have some relation with our affections (preferences). Thus, in order for a sense of justice to develop, principles cannot be arbitrary.
They must be those principles that would have been chosen by a rational impartial agreement. c. we know, or have the reasoned belief that other agents are effectively playing their part in carrying out the principles, and this behavior , because of the content of the principles it conforms with, expresses an intention to be beneficial to us in impartial terms. Thus by playing our part in compliance we may be understood as reciprocating other agents' intentions -i.e. our compliance is conditional on theirs;
d. owing to the hypothesis of public knowledge, also other agents are predicted as having (and we know that they have) the reasoned belief that we do our part in benefiting them in an impartial manner by acting upon the principles, and thus they may be seen as reciprocating our intention expressed by our compliance with the principles -hence our compliance is conditional on their reciprocity as well.
e. When these conditions are satisfied, our capacity to form a 'sense of justice'
becomes effective and translates into a motivational force able to counteract incentives to act unjustly in situation like the Prisoner's Dilemma game -i.e. a psychological preference for complying overcomes the preference for personal advantages gained by not complying and opportunistically exploiting other agents' cooperation.
What we will see in the next section is how conformist preferences derived from the Rawlsian idea of a sense of justice may affect compliance with the social contract amongst the firm and its stakeholders. Preferences incorporating the sense of justice will affect compliance by selecting as admissible the only subset of equilibria which are compatible with compliance with the agreed principles.
The motivational role of social contract: conformist preferences in the trust game
Any equilibrium point exerts a (limited) motivational force able to command actual behavior, which is effective in so far as each player believes that other players will play their strategy components of the same equilibrium. One may wonder whether the fact that a norm has been agreed from an ex ante (pre-play) perspective and exhibits various levels of consistency with different equilibria, may affect the motivational force exerted by different equilibria in a game. A positive answer would amount to a restriction on the number of equilibrium points that have motivational force over the players' behavior. In other words, one may ask whether norms can 'refine' the equilibrium set of a game in terms of the motivational strength of certain equilibria over other equilibria.
A voluntary CSR norm constraining the firm's discretion in the firm /stakeholder interaction, would in fact perform a motivational function. It would restrict the admissible equilibrium set in the event that -having been chosen via a unanimous impartial agreement and granted that players expect reciprocal compliance with the norm -it generates an additional utility weight to be introduced into the pay-offs of the players. The conjecture is that a preference for equilibrium strategies may in part depend not just on their outcomes, but
also on the level of conformity that any equilibrium exhibits in regard to an agreed norm. A conformity level must be understood as conditional on beliefs -that is, conformity depends on one player's compliance given his/her beliefs about the other players' behaviors and about other players' reciprocity in compliance, given their beliefs. It follows that the additional psychological pay-off involved by a given level of conformity is not just an exogenous parameter reflecting the absolute motivational force of the desire to be consistent with an agreed norm. The exogenous component is also conditioned by a function of beliefs concerning reciprocal behaviors.
Whatever the case, if the norm generates a modification in the players' pay-offs in favor of situations in which no significant deviation from reciprocal conformity occurs, then it may be that the overall motivational strength reinforcing an equilibrium behavior may be integrated (relatively augmented or reduced) by an additional motivational factor that in the end confines overall motivational strength only to those equilibria that exhibit significant compliance levels with the norm.
The reference is of course to a different notion of equilibrium -the psychological Nash equilibrium (Geanakoplos, et al., 1989 ) -based on conformist preferences (Grimalda and Sacconi 2005; Sacconi and Grimalda 2007) 2 . This results from a modification of the players' utility functions through integration of preferences with an intrinsic component for norm compliance, seen not as unilateral and unconditioned, but as conditioned by beliefs about other players' reciprocal conformity. The 'refinement effect' on the admissible equilibria that this change in the equilibrium notion entails is surprising (and unexpected). As we will see, the equilibrium set of the repeated Trust Games under this revision of the utility function shrinks dramatically to the pure strategy equilibria of the repeated psychological Trust Game 3 .
To begin, let us illustrate the conformist preference model with reference to its application to the one shot (stage) Trust Game (TG) involving a firm (player B) and its stakeholder social contract of the firm.
Conformist preferences
Let us assume that players have just agreed on a social contract concerning the principle of justice that should govern as a norm the distribution of the social surplus produced by means of their cooperation through the firm. Conformist preferences may now enter the picture.
Intuitively speaking, a stakeholder will gain intrinsic utility from simply complying with the principle, if the same stakeholder expects that in doing so she will be able to contribute to fulfilling the distributive principle, and taking into account that she expects the other stakeholders (or the firm) also to contribute to fulfilling the same principle, given their expectations.
A complete measure of the player preferences is an overall utility function combining material utility, derived from her consequentialist preferences, with the representation of her conformist preferences represented by the conformist-psychological component of her utility function (see Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005) . The overall utility function of player i with reference to the state σ (understood as a strategy combination of player i strategy σ i and the other players' strategies σ -i ,), is the following
U i is player i's material utility for the state σ ;
ii.
λ i is an exogenous parameter λ i < 0 ; iii. T is a fairness principle defined for the state σ;
iv.
F is a compounded index expressing the agent i's conditional conformity and her expectation of reciprocal by any other player j with respect to the principle T for each state σ 
Second, a measure of the extent to which, given the other agents' expected actions, the first player by her strategy choice contributes to a fully fair distribution of material pay-offs in terms of the principle T. This may also be put in terms of the extent to which the first player is responsible for a fair distribution, given what (she expects that) the other player will do. It is a conditional conformity index assuming values from 0 (no conformity at all, when the first player chooses a strategy that minimizes the value of T given his/her expectation about the other strategy choice) to 1 (full conformity, when the first player chooses a strategy that maximizes the value of T given the other player's expected strategy choice) with the following form player's i conditional conformity index:
This index takes its values as a function of f i which in turn varies from 0 to -1 and measures player i's deviation degree from the ideal principle T by making her choice conditional on her expectation about player j's behavior player's i deviation degree: Fourth, there is an exogenous parameter λ (λ> 0) representing the motivational force of the agent's psychological disposition to act on the motive of reciprocal conformity with an    agreed norm. This is a psychological parameter representing how strong the sense of justice or the 'desire to be just' has grown up for an individual in a given population; it may be taken as dependent on exogenous variables like as the development of the affective capacity to act upon one's principles and duties that comes from lower level domain of interaction (as in Rawls' theory of moral development, the family and the circle of friends and small scale associations). Notice however that in the model it doesn't operates as such but as only once the agreement over T is given and as it is weighted by the measure of reciprocal conformity.
In fact steps two and three coalesce in defining an overall index F of conditional and expected reciprocal conformity for each player in each state of the game. This index operates as a weight on the parameter λ, deciding whether it will actually affect or not (and, if so, to what extent) the player's pay-offs. Thus the complete psychological component of the utility function representing conformist preferences is
which reduces to the following cases: 
where a<1 since at least one (or both) of x and y are 0< x <-1 and 0< y <-1, if player i partially deviates and /or expects player j partially deviates from complete conformity; (iii) aλ =0 since in the above expression at least one (or both) of x or y are -1, if player i does not conform at all and/or expects that player j doesn't conform at all.
Summing up the effect of the different components, if a stakeholder expects that the firm (or vice versa) is reciprocally responsible for the maximal value of T, given what the firm expects about that stakeholder's behaviour, and the former is also responsible for a maximal value of T given the firm's (expected) behaviour, then the motivational weight of conformity λ will entirely enter the stakeholder's utility function. In other words, in the player's preference system λ will show all the force of the disposition to conform to agreed norms, so that complying with the principle will yield full conformist utility (in the psychological sense) in addition to the material pay-off of the same strategy. In the one shot Trust Game, this happens for example in the state of affairs where the stakeholder enters, the firm does not abuse, and they mutually predict these strategy choices. In this particular case, the status quo coincides with the outcome of the no-entry strategy -
(1,1) -which is the assurance level that player A can grant herself for whatever player B's choice, included the case that he doesn'tany trust based interaction. This pay-off must then be subtracted from whatever pay-off is used in the calculation of the Nash product annexed to any state of affair (strategy combination). The two further matrices (see below)
show respectively (b) the Nash bargaining product calculated for each pure strategy combination needed to measure the consistency of each state with respect to the principle T and the players' relevant degrees of conditional and expected reciprocal conformity for each state, and (c) the overall pay-offs resulting from the addition of the psychological conformist preference weight λ = 2 to the material pay-offs where this addition is appropriate. In order to understand the psychological payoffs reported in matrix (c), consider that if a player cannot do anything better to improve the 'collective' value of the principle T with respect to the status quo by means of her/his unilateral decision given the expected strategy choice of the other player, then s/he will be considered completely compliant by choosing to keep the status quo (no deviation from maximal conformity can be ascribed to her/his responsibility since her/his choice cannot do any better to maximize T than keeping to the status quo). This feature of the model depends on considering compliance in a noncooperative ex post context wherein players are able to deviate unilaterally from an agreed norm, and secondly by considering conformity as conditional on the other player's expected level of compliance. Hence, in cases like the Trust Game, if the firm is expected to abuse, the stakeholder cannot do anything to improve the value of T on the status quo and therefore the stakeholder will be considered fully compliant with the principle by deciding to stay out. (As a matter of fact she could only worsen the T value by entering.) At the same time, the firm predicting that the stakeholder will stay out -given he believes that the firm shall abusecannot modify the value of T with respect to the status quo. Thus whatever the firm's strategy choice, it is fully compliant in this case. The result is that also in the (no-entry, abuse) equilibrium point of the basic Trust Game, the conformity weight λ adds to the players' payoffs. Under this respect, there is no difference between the case (no-entry, abuse) and the case of the stakeholder entering because she predicts that the firm is going not to be abusive and the firm refraining from being abusive because it predicts that the stakeholder will enter (entry, no-abuse) -which is obviously the case in which both players unconditionally maximize T and hence necessarily the weight λ enters their payoffs as they are full compliant.
By contrast, if the stakeholder enters when the firm is unilaterally predicted to abuse, she would minimize T with reference to the alternative choice open to her of not entering, which scores a higher level of T. At the same time, the firm misses the opportunity to maximize T given the stakeholder's decision to enter, and hence the latter will be considered as not complying at all. This implies that when the firm unilaterally and successfully abuses its stakeholder, none of the conformist preferences can add value to the players' material payoffs.
Lastly, if the firm chooses a mixed strategy whereby the stakeholder's decision between entry or non-entry has no influence on the T value, the stakeholder, whether she decides to enter or not, would be unable to improve the value of T. Therefore, by staying out she maximizes T as well. If, however, the stakeholder still stays out, no firm's strategy can do any better in maximizing T than the one just described, and thus the firm is as well completely    compliant as when it abuses. Hence, a firm's mixed strategy responded to by the stakeholder's no-entry strategy implies that conformist weights are added to the player's pay-offs. On the contrary, were the stakeholder willing to enter when the firm adopts the mixed strategy (so that by entering she is equally compliant as when staying out), the firm would become responsible for a sharp deviation from full compliance, for he could have chosen not to abuse at all. In that case, he would not have maximized the value of T as he possibly could have.
This may not be the minimum value for T, but he has nonetheless produced a significant deviation from full compliance (proportional to the distance from the maximum value of T conditional on the stakeholder's choice). Thus, in this case the motivational weight of conformity cannot enter the utility functions of both players in all its strength.
The previous discussion illustrates a particularity in the way the firm's conditional conformity index and reciprocally expected conformity index (as seen in the stakeholders' eyes) behave in games like the trust game, and in general in games where the strategy of one player would induce the same result whatever the behavior of the second player. The stakeholder's strategy ¬e (the trustor's strategy in the trust game in general) in fact causes the same pair of payoffs whatever the reply of the firm (the trustee). Hence the firm by its behavior can't make any difference about the two pair of the players' payoffs that are possible when stakeholder-player chooses ¬e , which both will be necessarily (1,1). Since T is a function of the material payoffs, also the value of T is thus invariant in the two states compatible with stakeholder's strategy ¬e. (Notice that in the sequential version of the trust game this is quite natural: by playing ¬e the stakeholder, player A, stays out of the interaction and thus prevent the firm form having any influence over the outcome of the game, which in fact is only one, whatever the decision of player B could have been.). This means that in our case the firm, given the stakeholder's strategy ¬e cannot do any better than to witness the first player bringing about the value 0 of function T representing the distribution principle of social welfare. Saying it differently, in case the stakeholder doesn't enter, no value higher than T = 0 does exist that can be obtained through a choice of the firm. So, whatever the strategic choice deliberated by the firm, it cannot induce any deviation from the maximum possible value of T, given ¬e. Neither of the firms' choices -let it be a or ¬a -may deviate at any rate from the maximin possible value of T (= 0) given that the stakeholder's choice is ¬e.
Thus for both the firm's strategy choices, conformity will be as high as possible given the stakeholder's choice ¬e.
In terms of determinants of the firm's conditional conformity index and expected reciprocity index (as seen in the stakeholder s' eyes) the differences between the T values    determined by any firm's strategy choice and the maximum possible value of T (conditional on the given the stakeholder's choice ¬e) are thus zero:
This is true for any pure or mixed strategy of the firm (e.g. included any probabilistic combination of a and ¬a) granted that the stakeholder stays out.
This entails -and this is the peculiarity in how the indexes behave to be pointed out herethat the firm's conditional deviation degree and the firm's expected reciprocal deviation degree in the case under consideration are indefinite. In fact as far as no strategy of the firm, given ¬e, may induce any difference with respect the value of T, this also entails that the Max and Min value of function T are even, given ¬e (i.e. T MAX (¬e) = T MIN (¬e) = 0). So that their difference reported at the denominator is nil (i.e. neither the numerator nor denominator may report any distance from the maximum value of T given ¬e). Hence both the deviation degree and the reciprocally expected deviation degree are necessarily 0/0, namely indefinite. But of course this occurs because there is no proper sense in normalizing the measure of deviation from the max value of T given ¬e with respect to the interval from 0 to -1, by taking it as a fraction of the distance between the maximum and the minimum value of T in cases where this distance is nil. In these case simply the fraction is meaningless.
Thus in this and all the analogous cases in which, given a certain adversary's choice, the maximum and minimum value of T determined by a player's choice scores difference equal to zero, we will assume that the degree of deviation from the maximum value of T due to this player's choices is simply represented by the absolute value of the difference between the T value determined by the player's choice (given the adversary's choice) and the maximum T value possible given that adversary's choice. Notice however that, because the T value is identical for all this players' choices given the adversary's behavior, the deviation is necessarily nil for that player and hence also this deviation measure -even without normalization -is necessarily 0. Thus the conformity indexes cannot be but 1.
Coming back to the trust game of matrix (a), by considering first the psychological utilities of the firm, when the stakeholder is predicted to play ¬e, then the firm would score full conformity both playing a or ¬a. But only when the firm believes that the stakeholder predicts that he (the firm) plays a then the stakeholder's reciprocal conformity would be full by using ¬e. In fact in case the firm believed to be predicted to use ¬a, then the stakeholder's not entering choice would minimize T, and then the stakeholders reciprocally expected conformity would be 0. Thus under the strategy combination (¬e, a), represented through first
and second order beliefs of the firm, the firm's conformity index and the stakeholder's reciprocal expected conformity index equal 1. So that the weight  fully enters the psychological payoff of the firm. On the contrary under the combination (¬e, ¬a) -again seen through the firm's beliefs -the stakeholder's reciprocal conformity index equals zero, what would nullify the weight  in the firm's psychological payoff.
As well, coming now to the stakeholder's psychological utilities, if the firm is predicted to use the strategy a, then the stakeholder's strategy ¬e scores full conditional conformity, since
by playing e the stakeholder would induce a lower T value and no other stakeholder strategy than ¬e can induce a higher T value. Otherwise, if the stakeholder believes that the firm predicts that she uses ¬e, then the firm's reciprocal conformity expected in case the firm is predicted to use a or ¬a is even (as high as possible in these contingency), i.e. the firm's reciprocally expected conformity equals 1. Thus, given these stakeholder's conditional conformity and firm's expected reciprocal conformity indexes for the combination (¬e, a), as seen through the stakeholder beliefs, the weight  enters the psychological payoff of the stakeholder. This would not be the case if the stakeholder predicted that the firm was to use ¬a. In fact, as far as the stakeholder plays ¬e, it is true that the firms' expected reciprocal conformity index (as seen by the stakeholder) is even (and equal 1) for both the choices a and ¬a. But if she predicts ¬a, the stakeholder's conditional conformity of choosing ¬e would be minimal (set to 0). So that the weight  would be canceled in the stakeholder's psychological utility function for the (¬e, ¬a) combination. Summing up, taking the game matrix line corresponding to the strategy ¬e, the weight  enters the psychological payoffs of both the players only in the state represented by the bottom right cell.
What has been said till now is by no means conclusive about the existence of psychological equilibria based on conformist preferences in the one shot Trust Game.
However it helps to understand how the psychological payoffs behave under different strategic and beliefs configurations. Psychological equilibria (in pure strategies) are then simply calculable. Inspection of matrix (b) shows that if the firm is predicted to play strategy a, the stakeholder maximizes T by playing strategy ¬e. If this is known, the firm also maximizes T by playing a, since neither strategy is better or worse than a in order to maximize T from the firm's point of view. Hence, in the bottom right cell of matrix (c) the psychological weight λ adds to each player's material pay-off. On the other hand, if the firm is predicted to play ¬a, then the stakeholder maximizes T by choosing e. If this choice is also predicted by the firm, his choice for maximizing T is ¬a as well. Consequently, in the top left cell of matrix (c) psychological weights λ are also present. If the firm plays abuse (a), the    stakeholder will minimize T by entering (e), which is also true if the same result is seen the other way round (given e, the firm minimizes T by abusing with a). No weights must then be added in the top right cell of matrix (c). Lastly, if the firm is predicted as not abusing, the stakeholder minimizes T by staying out with ¬e. Consequently, even though the firm is maximizing T when he plays ¬a , a zero index of individual conformity (the stakeholder's) is sufficient to nullify the overall level of conformity. Moreover, when this is the case, no psychological conformity weights are implied in the players' pay-offs (see bottom left cell of the (c) matrix) .
Summing up, given the value λ = 2, we may see that, as far as only pure strategies are concerned, two Nash psychological equilibria do exists (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬a) and (¬e, a). Thus even in the one shot game, the situation is ameliorated for not only the 'bad' equilibrium is now possible, but from the point of view of the solution determinateness the situation is also worsened as it isn't any unique. I don't bother here the reader with the existence of mixed-strategypsychological-Nash equilibria in the one-shot Trust Game as they are mostly relevant to out argument in the context of the repeated Trust Game considered in the next section (where also many standard Nash equilibria are possible). It is within the perspective of the repeated Trust
Game that we have to verify whether conformist preferences with an ex ante agreed principle of justice will simplify the equilibrium selection problem.
4.
Mixed strategies and refinement of the equilibrium set in the iterated trust game
Mixed strategies
Now let us consider the repeated Trust Game (TG). Recall that its pay-off space in terms of material utilities is the convex hull of all the linear (probability) combinations of the three pay-off vectors generated out of the pure strategy pairs of the basic Trust Game (see Figure   2 ). This is the same as representing the expected pay-offs of every possible pair of pure and mixed strategies of the two players in the basic Trust Game. In fact the player's i expected pay-off for a mixed strategy is formally the same as the average pay-off of the player's i repeated strategy that employs alternatively the two player's i pure strategies of the stage game with a given frequency, generating the three stage-game outcomes (1,1,), (4,4), (0, 5) according to the frequency of the two players' choices. The cumulative pay-off of this repeated strategy, given a certain pure (or mixed) response by the second player, can be    equated to the average pay-off of a cycle along which player i gets each of the three stagegame payoffs a given number of times out of the total number of times defining the cycle (granted, of course, that during the game each repeated strategy pairs used by any player repeatedly enters a cycle with the same pattern of outcomes and the same average payoff value for the player that adopts it). It is thus simple to see that a firm's mixed strategy that employs the two pure strategies ¬a and a with probability 0.25 and 0.75, respectively, against -to keep things simple -the stakeholder's pure entry strategy e, affords the firm and the stakeholder expected the pay-offs (0.25×4+0.75×5 = 4.75) and (0.25×4+0.75×0 = 1),
respectively. This is equal to the average values attached to a repeated strategy whereby the firm plays the stage-game strategy ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬a 75 per cent of the time and the stage-game strategy a 25 per cent of the time, assuming -to keep things simple again -that the stakeholder always responds with the stage-game strategy e. It is obvious to see that in the one-shot Trust Game, no mixed strategy exists as a best response for the firm. In the repeated Trust Game, however, one knows that this is no longer true. In fact, the firm may create a reputation (along, for example, the first N repetitions of the game) to be a type that uses the strategies ¬a and a in a given frequency, such that the stakeholder's best response is 'always e' until by repeated observations he realizes that the frequency is respected, but sanctioning by '¬e forever' were it to become clear that the frequency is not respected. This induces the firm to stick to its repeated strategy, mixing a and ¬a according to the given frequency.
One must, however, consider the pay-off space of the psychological game, which can be generated from that of the Trust Game when all of the expected pay-offs of mixed strategy pairs are accounted for. This repeated psychological Trust Game in pure and mixed strategies has the same material pay-off space as the repeated TG, wherein the average pay-offs of each repeated strategy -which employs the pure strategies of a player in a given frequency -is identical to the expected utility of the mixed strategy using the corresponding probability mixtures. Hence, one may ask what happens (under the psycological extension)to the mixed strategy equilibrium points of the corresponding standard repeated Trust Game.
Before answering that question, one must define a way to calculate the expected psychological utility of any mixed strategy. Let us take the point of view of the stakeholder (call him A) when she predicts that the firm (call it B) will choose a mixed strategy, for example:
σ B 0.6 ={(0.6, ¬a); (0.4, a)}.
  
A believes that if she enters by playing the pure strategy e, two states (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬a) and (e, a) may occur, so that two different values of the principle T -namely (9) Since the conformity indexes of players A and B for the strategy pair (e, σ B 0.6 ) are 1 and 0.61, respectively, the psychological conformity weight λ will enter the players' utility functions accordingly, that is, by a value (1)(0.61)λ. Given λ = 2 , the weight of the conformist motivation is 1.22, and the overall utility pay-offs of players A and B are 3.62 and 5.62, respectively.
In the repeated psychological Trust Game, these pay-offs correspond to the following pair of player B and player A's repeated strategies: player B employs his pure strategies ¬a and a repeatedly with frequency 0.6 and 0.4 respectively. By this repeated strategy, he tries to convince player A (or the sequence of short-run players who participate in the repeated game in the position of A) that he will stick to this frequency forever. Player A decides to play repeatedly her entry strategy e as long as she does not see player B employing abuse with a    frequency higher than 0.4, but if this frequency is exceeded she will switch to '¬e forever'.
Since player A's threat seems convincing, player B plays ad infinitum his above-defined mixed repeated strategy. Assume that exactly 100 times are sufficient to say that the required frequency has been verified so that -if the players adopt the pair of repeated strategies described above -100 times is a cycle that repeats more and more along the repeated game with always the same proportion of stage games with outcomes (e, a) and stage games with outcome (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬a). The average pay-offs for this pair of repeated strategies -including the psychological component -is the vector (3.62, 5.62). It would seem to be a good incentive for player A to yield to player B's mixed abuse strategy, but I will come back to this point a little later.
Following the method mentioned above, under the hypothesis λ = 2, it is in fact possible to account for the entire pay-off space of the psychological Trust Game, including mixed strategies as well (see Figure 3) . First, let us note that the status quo point (1,1) -the only Nash equilibrium of the basic one-shot TG and moreover an equilibrium of the repeated TG -is translated in the northeast direction along the bisector to a point with overall utilities (3,3), which is also a psychological equilibrium of the new game. At the same time, thanks to the motivational conformist weights λ = 2, the outcome (4,4) where the Nash bargaining product is maximized translates in the northeast direction to the point (6,6), which is also a psychological equilibrium. Let us recall that both these psychological equilibria correspond to Nash equilibria of the repeated Trust Game, so that these two Nash equilibria are sure to be preserved under the pay-off change provided by conformist preferences.
In regard to player B's mixed strategies, it can be seen that the entry strategy e of player A cannot be rewarded with any additional psychological conformist utility until the expected Nash Bargaining product -the expected value of T associated with any particular probability mixture of the two pure strategies ¬a and a -is no longer positive, granted player A uses e.
This necessarily happens until a mixed strategy associates the pure strategy ¬a with a probability high enough to give the respective T value (9) a weight able to counterbalance the T value of a (-4) , so that the T expected value exceeds the T level fixed by the 'status quo' noentry strategy (which is 0). Hence, within player B's continuous set of probability mixtures of two pure strategies ¬a and a, the relevant threshold is fixed by player B's mixed strategy that scores an expected Nash product no different from the T value of staying out. As long as this threshold is not exceeded, psychological pay-offs do not add any values to the material payoffs of both players A and B, because entering by e minimizes the T value and exhibits zero conformity level. This is true also when player B adopts a mixed strategy that makes him partially, and hence positively, compliant. In fact until player A's choice to enter by e exhibits a zero conformity index, the overall conformity level is also nil for both players and no psychological pay-offs can be added to their material pay-offs.
This does not mean that psychological utilities are not at work for these mixed strategies.
Simply, the psychological component adds to the pay-offs of strategy pairs such as (no entry, mixed strategy), which is the same as for the strategy pair (no entry, abuse), namely (3,3).
This means that the best responses for these cases is ¬e, which gives player A an overall payoff 3, whereby player B's mixed strategies and his pure strategy a become indifferent as they both give B the same overall payoff 3.
As an example, consider the mixed strategy σ B 0.25 ={(0.25, ¬a); (0.75, a)}. The expected Nash bargaining product (the T value) is negative (−0.75) for the pair (e, σ B 0.25 ), whereas T is 0 if player A chooses ¬e. It is thus obvious that A maximizes T by choosing ¬e , with    conformity index 1, whereas the conformity index for choosing e is 0. As a result, by entering with e, player A can only get the expected overall pay-off 1, which -due to the probability mixture provided by σ B 0.25 -is no different from the material pay-off of staying out. By staying out with ¬e, however, he gets an overall pay-off 3, because the psychological conformist weight 2 now adds to this strategy's material pay-off. Thus, A's best response is obviously to stay out. As far as player B is concerned, the mixed strategy σ 4.75 sufficient to make the strategy σ B 0.25 preferred than a when A plays e, simply because, due to a sufficiently high λ associated with the psychological equilibrium in pure strategies (entry, no-abuse), playing ¬a pays B more (namely 6).
The threshold that allows mixed strategies to gain support from psychological conformist utility is reached at the mixed strategy σ B 0.307 ={(0.307, ¬a); (0.693, a)}. Given this mixed strategy, the expected value of T is zero for any strategy choice by A, so that A is fully conformist by choosing either e or ¬e. 4 At the same time, playing the mixed strategy is partially conformist also for player B, because the minimization of the T value, given A's entrance, would be obtained by playing a. Hence, under the pair (e, σ B 0.307 ), psychological utilities add to both the players' material pay-offs (1.3, 4.7) generating an overall pay-off vector (1.84, 5.31). It is important to note, however, that adding a bit of psychological utility does not mean that this strategy combination becomes a psychological equilibrium. Although it is true that player B's mixed strategy σ B 0.307 grants a positive overall pay-off to A's entry strategy, player A's overall pay-off from no-entry (i.e. 3) is still higher than the overall payoff (1.84) from giving in to player B's mixed strategy. This is due to the incomplete conformity level of strategy σ B 0.307 when player A chooses e. In fact B's full conformity would be reached by the strategy ¬a, whereas σ B 0.307 scores only the modest conformity index 0.31.
  
This affects the psychological conformist component of player A's overall pay-off for strategy e, which is lower than for ¬e. Now let us consider mixed strategy σ B 0.39 ={(0. 0.39, ¬a); (0. 61, a)}. With this small increase in the probability of strategy ¬a, things finally seem to change. Player A with overall pay-off 2.36 benefits substantially from the psychological conformist utility of her entry strategy e , . At the same time, as typically happens when a pure strategy is surpassed in its conformity index, player A's conformity index of no-entry drops to zero, since choosing ¬e given σ B 0.39 would minimize the value of T in respect to the alternative entry strategy (and also any other mixed strategy). Hence, player A's overall utility for the no-entry strategy ¬e also dramatically drops to 1 (the material pay-off only). Moreover, for the pair (e, σ B 0.39 ) , player B's overall pay-off contains a substantial psychological conformist component such that his overall pay-off now reaches 5.41. If player A were to choose ¬e, however, player B's pay-off would be reduced just to his material pay-off 1, since the conformity index of player A's strategy ¬e is zero (though B's index remains positive). Note, nonetheless, that this does not imply that one has reached an equilibrium point. Even though entry is player A's best reply to player B's mixed strategy σ B 0.39 , this strategy is not reciprocally player B's best response. The perfectly compliant strategy ¬a would do better in terms of conformity index, scoring an overall pay-off 6 higher than the mixed strategy.
This suggests a general fact about the model. Let us consider again the mixed strategy σ B 0.6 ={(0.6, ¬a); (0.4, a)}.
As we know, player A's conformity index if she uses strategy e against σ B 0.6 is 1, whereas the mixed strategy's conformity index is 0.61. The annexed overall pay-offs are (3.62, 5.62), respectively. Even though high psychological conformist utility enters both the players' payoffs, this is not enough to define reciprocal best responses at (e, σ B 0.6 ) since, given player A's entry strategy, player B's best reply is again no-abuse at all with its overall pay-off 6.
Equilibrium set of the psychological repeated Trust Game
  
In order to give a general assessment of the two players' best reply sets in the psychological Trust Game, let us assume that λ is high enough for the pure strategy equilibrium (e,¬a) to exist. Let us call E n|e (Π A,B ) the expected Nash Bargaining Product corresponding to player B's n-ary mixed strategy σ B n (where the index n corresponds to the probability weight assigned to the pure strategy ¬a) given player A's strategy e. Hence, let Π A,B denote a generic Nash bargaining product. Lastly, let's call 'status quo' the material payoff granted by A's pure strategy ¬e. The relevant facts about the psychological Trust Game are the following.
• Case 1, ∀σ B n with n > 0 s.t. E n|e (Π A,B ) < 0, such that the pure strategy ¬e induces Π A,B = 0
n , the pure strategy e does not add any psychological conformist utility to player
A's material pay-off, whereas the pure strategy ¬e adds the psychological conformity weight λ to the 'status quo' material pay-off. Hence player A's best reply is ¬e whereby any mixed strategy in this case is as good as strategy a to player B. The equilibrium for this case is the psychological equilibrium point (¬e, a). This equilibrium is weak since every mixed strategy in this case gives player B the same overall pay-off of a.
• Case 2, ∀σ B n with 0<n<1 s.t. E n|e (Π A,B ) > 0, such that the pure strategy ¬e induces Π A,B = 0 < E(Π A,B ) n . Each pair (e, σ B n ) adds some psychological conformist utility to both players' material pay-offs, whereas the pure strategy ¬e reduces player A to the 'status quo' material pay-off. This follows from the minimal conformity index of strategy ¬e , while in this case mixed strategies σ B n have positive conformity indexes strictly less than 1. Thus for both players A and B, there is an intermediate overall index F of conditional and expected reciprocal conformity. In this case, player A's best reply is strategy e.
Nevertheless, against strategy e, player B's best is ¬a. In other words, as little as player B's psychological conformist utility of a mixed strategy σ B n is positive, player B's pure strategy ¬a against e (or whatever mixed strategy by player A) induces a psychological conformist pay-off higher than σ B n , so that player B has an incentive to deviate from σ B n to ¬a. When this occurs, player A obviously has no reason to change her choice, and the equilibrium point is (e, ¬a).
• her overall pay-off gained from (e, σ B n ) since, whereas the two pure strategies e and ¬e score the same conformity index, the case of player B's conformity indexes is different.
Player B against ¬e cannot do any better than play σ B n with conformity index 1, but given e the strategy σ B n conformity index is strictly less than 1, which is the conformity index of his pure strategy ¬a. Since the strictly less than 1 conformity index of strategy σ B n directly depends on the required probability value n, which also affects the expected material utility of player A for (e, σ B n ), this correlation is crucial in this case. It turns out that the greater player A's pay-off gained from (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ a) is, the smaller the probability required for the Π A,B indifference, but also the smaller the resulting player B conformity index for σ B n .
Thus, player B's small conformity index at the same time affects negatively (via a small probability) player A's material expected utility -since a small probability of (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬ a) will counterbalance its high pay-off -and also makes the strategy e psychological utility increasingly lower than the strictly dominant psychological utility of strategy ¬e. The resulting equilibrium point of this case is still (¬e, a).
Boundaries between the three cases are established by the distribution of the material payoffs associated with any mixed strategy, and in particular how much surplus it assigns to player A. As long as a mixed strategy overwhelmingly advantages player B in relation to player A, the T expected value of the mixed strategy pair (e, σ B n ) cannot exceed that of player A's staying out. This is not just because A is dissatisfied with his/her material outcome, but because of the insufficient conformity index of such mixed strategies. When a mixed strategy σ B n instead offers a substantial share of the material surplus to player A, it becomes the most conformist solution, and then provides psychological utility to both the players against a loss of material pay-off to B. At this point, however, player B is able to compare the psychological utility of incomplete conformity against that of full conformity. It is evident that if the parameter λ is high enough to guarantee the existence of the psychological equilibrium in pure strategies, then it is also true that player B will always prefer the pure strategy of full conformity.
This also depends, of course, largely on the λ exogenous parameter of the two players (granted they are symmetric, which is not necessarily true 
From this proposition comes the following
COROLLARY
In the repeated psychological Trust Game, psychological equilibria 'refine' the equilibrium set of the corresponding repeated TG in a discontinuous way as a function of the increase in the motivational exogenous parameter λ.
• Given any λ such that in the one-shot psychological TG, there is no psychological equilibrium in correspondence with the pair (e, ¬a), the psychological equilibrium set is the same as the equilibrium set of the standard repeated TG due to the sole effect of material pay-offs (see northeast boundary Z in Figure 4 ).
• If the value of λ is such that in the one-shot psychological TG player B's overall payoff derived from the strategy combination (e, ¬a) is no different from the overall payoff derived by B from the strategy combination (e, a) -so that a weak psychological equilibrium exists for (e, ¬a) -then in the corresponding psychological repeated TG the psychological equilibria constituted by any mixed strategy σ B n and the pure strategy e have all the same player B expected pay-offs, and thus they are all weak equilibria. Given the continuity of the probability mixture set over the two pure strategies ¬a and a, the value of λ such that this is true is unique (see northeast boundary Y in Figure 4 ).
• If λ is such that in the psychological one-shot TG in correspondence to the pair (e, ¬a) there is a strong psychological equilibrium, then in the repeated psychological TG there are no psychological equilibria in mixed strategies and the psychological equilibrium set dramatically shrinks to the only two pure strategy equilibrium points (e, ¬a) and (¬e, a). (See northeast boundary X of Figure 4 ).
The corollary is important, because it is in this context that we see our result. As far as the pay-off space of a one-shot basic TG is concerned, mixed strategies are not equilibria. If B adopts a mixed strategy that induces A to enter, B immediately has an incentive to deviate to the abuse strategy since the mixed strategy is not the best reply to A's choice to enter. On the contrary, if the pay-off space is seen (as in the corollary) as the convex set of all the average pay-offs for repeated strategies in a repeated TG, then represented within this space may be the average pay-offs of player B's repeated strategies mixing the two pure strategies a and ¬a according to some pre-established frequencies.
Thus, if player B is able to accumulate a reputation of being a player that unfailingly plays one such strategy, he will have no reason to deviate if player A adopts a conditioned strategy of entrance like 'as long as my observations are compatible with the hypothesis that B is playing a and ¬a according to the given pre-established frequency, I will continue to enter by e, but if I find that my observations are incompatible with that frequency, I will switch to ¬e forever'. In fact, given player A's conditioned entrance strategy, player B verifies that maintaining his reputation of being the type of player who uses the repeated strategy 'abuse no more than x per cent of the time, and no abuse for the rest of the time' is profitable since it allows him to gain a certain portion of the surplus. Summing up, player B has the incentive to keep abuses at a certain frequency in order to support his reputation of being the relevant type. What happens is that if player B has chosen a repeated mixed strategy whereby he has been able to accumulate a positive reputation that induces player A to enter for the first time, then he immediately recognizes the incentive to switch to a strategy that employs ¬a with higher frequency. This feature of the repeated psychological TG completely changes the best response structure with regard to the standard repeated TG. In the standard case, player B has a clear incentive to maintain his strategy once he has been able to build up a reputation for being a mixed type, since abusing less would give away a larger part of the surplus to player A, while abusing more would induce player A to carry out her sanction. At the same time,
player A has a strong incentive to monitor and sanction the relevant possible deviation by player B. In the repeated psychological TG, by contrast, player B's best reply to player A's entry is to deviate from any mixed strategy σ B n to ¬a. If, however, player B deviates to a strategy more concessive to him, A does not have any reason to punish him. Thus, the repeated mixed strategy equilibrium of the basic repeated TG is destabilized. Summing up, any mixed strategy by player B that induces player A to enter, according to player B's point of view is dominated by the pure strategy 'always ¬a', so that a rational player B would never strive after a reputation such as being committed to the mixed strategy σ B n . From the outset, he would prefer to develop the dominant reputation of being an 'always ¬a' player.
From this, the conclusion follows that even though generating a psychological game from a basic Trust Game enables us to determine new equilibrium points (in other words, to pass from only one equilibrium to at least two), when the change involves a step from the one-shot TG to the repeated TG, transforming the pay-off space by means of conformist preferences has a powerful effect in reducing the psychological equilibria to a subset of the Nash equilibria. It remains, however, that the equilibria are two. Which of the two is to be selected?
Social contract-based ex ante beliefs
It is a somewhat disturbing truth in the foundation of game theory that even the existence of 'one sole' Nash equilibrium point, but in the case it is in dominant strategies, does not assure per se sufficient conditions for deducing the rational solution of the game (see Bacharach 1987) . In order to predict that rational players will carry out their equilibrium strategies, something more is needed: the system of reciprocally consistent expectations that    justify the prediction that players will adopt exactly that combination of equilibrium strategies. A player rationally chooses an equilibrium strategy only when s/he has formed the backing expectation that the other players will also play the equilibrium strategy components of the same equilibrium point, so that his/her choice is rationally justified as his/her best response to them. Moreover, this backing expectation must be consistent with the assumption that the other players also act with similar backing expectations. Hence, in order to be considered as a solution that each player will rationally play, an equilibrium point even if unique needs previously to be predicted as the set of strategies that every player will play. In other words, it must be previously known by each player as the description of strategies that all the other players will effectively carry out, given that they all expect exactly these strategies from one another (this amounts to the somewhat circular statement that a Nash equilibrium is a solution as far as the solution -the equilibrium point to be the solution -is common knowledge).
Where can this previous knowledge come from? The simple existence of an equilibrium does not entail that it will be played since, again, in order to infer that it will actually be put into practice a player needs some reason to believe that other players besides him/herself have already formed the expectation that everybody will play it. In other words, a process of expectation formation converging on this mutually consistent system of beliefs and prediction must be worked out even in the apparently simple case that 'one sole' equilibrium point exists. Indubitably, therefore, a more pressing problem of expectations formation exists if the possible equilibrium points are many. Without answering the question as to which of them is mutually expected by players to be the actual solution of the game, there is no way to say that players have any incentive to play a particular strategy combination, even if it is an equilibrium point of the game.
To return to our context, recall that the foregoing section concluded that at most two Nash psychological equilibria remain as solution candidates once the game has been transformed into a psychological game through the ex ante agreement on a CSR norm and the introduction of conformist motivations. Two, however, are enough to create significant uncertainty about the actual solution. Though one of these equilibria properly corresponds to the ex ante agreement on a fairness principle (the Nash Bargaining Solution is maximized by the outcome (4,4), this is not enough to say that it is the predicted solution of the ex post game.
In order to solve the problem, the ex ante 'should-be' agreed solution should also be known as the ex post de facto implemented set of strategy choices. Any player knows that a strategy combination is implemented only if this knowledge is consistent with the prediction that any    other player also believes that everybody will in fact play that equilibrium. Could the fact that one has ex ante agreed on a principle corresponding to an equilibrium be sufficient to create this general expectation? It could, but it is important to realize that there is no necessity in this inference. What one decides to do in order to be impartial in the ex ante perspective is not necessarily what one will actually do in the ex post perspective. Moreover, it is not necessarily what other players will do in the ex post situation. This inference would be unwarranted from a logical point of view. Let us recall that the motivational force of conformist preference -driving players to conform with an ex ante agreed principle -also operates conditionally on the previous expectations that the counterparty will reciprocate compliance. Hence, the existence of a previous system of mutual expectations must also be granted in the context of psychological equilibria.
Here one appreciates the role that norms play in a cognitive process of belief formation converging on the mutual prediction across players that a given psychological equilibrium will be de facto executed. This role consists in a two-tiered answer. At a first stage, it is suggested that if each player has actually adopted a unanimous impartial agreement in the ex ante perspective, then s/he will get to hold at least one mental model of a decision maker (at least himself) who plans at a moment in time to act in accordance with the terms of the agreed course of action 3 .
Notwithstanding the genuineness of the intention, agreeing on a set of actions to be carried out later in fact implies making a plan on some ensuing action, which is simply the behavioral content of the statement of agreement. In order to stipulate that 'we will act in a certain way later on' -which may be seen as the content of a generic agreement -each player at least must have in mind the mental model of an agent who will act in that certain way later on, where the 'way' is the one signed in the agreement. What could otherwise be meant by finding a strategy combination that is an equilibrium point invariant under the players' position replacement, but having in mind a model of an agent who, without going against his/her incentives, behaves ex post exactly in the same way whatever his/her position in the game?
This is not a reason to say that if this mental model is admitted, then it follows that the player will actually carry out the correspondent action, nor is it a reason to say that if the existence of such a mental model is true for other players, then they will in fact carry out the corresponding actions. This is a matter of approximate and default reasoning, not one of pure logic or necessity (Reiter 1980; Bacharach 1994, Sacconi and Moretti 2008) . The model is derived from introspection, because the player him/herself is a rational agent who has been    able to plan action in accordance with the behavioral content of the statement of agreement.
The paradigmatic case whereby the model is derived by generalization is that of the agent him/herself. Let us therefore simply state that a player holds in his/her mind the mental model of a rational agent (himself) who acts according to the behavioral content of the statement which is the term of agreement.
Assume, moreover, that mental models are necessarily used in order to figure out possible situations and predict them (that is, no future behavior can be outguessed without a mental model of an agent performing the corresponding behavior). Let us hypothesize that at a point in time no further mental model of a rational agent comes to the mind of our players but that of an agent who will act in a certain way later on. If no contrary evidence is thus far forthcoming about the actual behavior of other players, the only way that an agent can simulate the other players' choice is to resort by default to his/her own mental model of a rational agent. By default, then, the same mental model is used to simulate every players' reasoning and behavior. This simulation can be recursive, so that a player uses his/her mental model not only to predict another player's behavior, but also in order to simulate the other player's reasoning and beliefs, so that a shared mental model of all the rational agents results in them all conforming to the terms of agreement.
This explains, if not justifies, why the agent may categorize or recognize this situation (until proof of the contrary) as an element of the class wherein agents conform to the norm. If a player has agreed on a fairness principle s/he normally has a mental model of an agent who carries out the corresponding commitment, for this is the behavioral content of the principle he has agreed to. Moreover, nothing in his/her knowledge base (until proof or evidence to the contrary) contradicts that an agent who subscribed to an agreement on the principle will carry out the corresponding commitment (assume this is provisionally true). This produces, as a matter of description of how players de facto reason (not as a matter of deduction from whatever absolute logical principle), the state of reciprocal beliefs that justifies the decision of any player to carry out the strategies consistent with the psychological equilibrium wherein the principle T reaches its absolute highest value -in the Trust Game the pair (e, ¬ ¬ ¬ ¬a). 
